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INTRODUCTION 
In the essay that started this discussion, Professor Mitchell Rubinstein 
provides a clear analysis of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sprint/United 
Management Company v. Mendelsohn1 and points out the lack of consis-
tency in post-Sprint decisions.2  Professor Rubinstein correctly concludes 
that, on balance, plaintiff-employees in employment discrimination cases 
ultimately stand to benefit more than defendant-employers from the Sprint 
decision.3  And, equally important, he predicts “that Sprint is going to result 
in much more ‘me too’ evidence being admitted, [which may result in] 
more expansive plaintiff discovery requests seeking out comparative em-
ployees and where such evidence is found, lengthier trials.”4 
Sprint is a substantially practical decision.  Accordingly, Professor 
Rubinstein does not attempt to impose an abstract theoretical framework 
onto the Sprint decision.5  Indeed, “me too” cases will continue to be de-
cided on a case-by-case basis, without reference to a larger theoretical pic-
ture.  An analogy to the proverbial “forest and the trees” is tempting, with 
the trees being various employment discrimination decisions and the forest 
the jurisprudence underlying employment discrimination cases. 
Yet, perhaps it is more helpful to think instead of an already dense, and 
now dramatically proliferating underbrush composed of employment dis-
crimination cases turning on the admission of “me too” evidence and testi-
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mony.6  Whether the courts clear out, set fire to, or fertilize this underbrush, 
is the open question with which Professor Rubinstein concludes his essay: 
“because the Court did not definitively resolve the issue, there likely will be 
additional litigation until the Supreme Court resolves it once and for all.” 7  
Hence, litigators and particular parties seem destined, at least for now, to 
continue trudging through the underbrush of “me too” evidence and em-
ployment discrimination law.  But, if we ever make it through the post-
Sprint underbrush, where, exactly, will we be? 
I. THE “HE SAID, SHE SAID” ANALOGUE 
Conflicting “he said, she said” testimony often frustrates plaintiff-
employees in employment discrimination cases, especially in the context of 
sexual harassment.8  Predictably, most harassers are careful enough to avoid 
providing any “smoking gun” evidence to third party witnesses; they in-
stead take care to ensure that no witnesses are present when they perpetrate 
unlawful conduct.9  As a result, in most situations, direct evidence, un-
equivocally attested to by a third-party witness, simply does not exist.10  
Plaintiffs, thus, must attempt to marshal sufficient circumstantial and indi-
rect evidence to overcome the stories told by their harassers in order to con-
vince jurors of their version of the events.  In simplest terms, if there is no 
evidence beyond the “he said, she said” debate, harassers, unfortunately, 
tend to win evidentiary ties.11 
 
6
  See, e.g., Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., Inc., 513 F.3d 1261, 1285–87 (11th Cir. 2008) (af-
firming the lower court’s admission of “me too” testimony to establish the existence of a hostile work 
environment as well as the employer’s intent to discriminate); Schrand v. Federal Pacific Elec. Co., 851 
F.2d 152, 157 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that the district court committed reversible error by admitting the 
“me too” testimony of two former employees because the “me too” testimony was “arguably . . . the 
strongest evidence in plaintiff’s favor at trial”) (quoting Mitroff v. Xomox Corp., 797 F.2d 271, 277 (6th 
Cir. 1986)). 
7
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8
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620 (D. S.C. 2004) (“Virtually all of the alleged sexual harassment occurred while Belson and a female 
employee were alone in an office together.  In other words, no third party witnessed the alleged harass-
ment. . . .  Consequently, all claims . . . turned largely on who was telling the truth in a “he said, she 
said” swearing contest.”). 
9
  See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 834–35 (1991) (“As in many rape 
cases, there are rarely witnesses, leaving the factfinder to weigh one person’s word against another’s.”); 
Susan M. Mathews, Title VII and Sexual Harassment: Beyond Damages Control, 3 YALE J. L. & 
FEMINISM 299, 315 (1991) (arguing that harassment victims should not have to fight against a legal sys-
tem that presumes their claims are not well-grounded, and that “this is especially critical because sexual 
harassment often takes place in the absence of third-party witnesses”). 
10
  Amy D. Ronner, The Cassandra Curse: The Stereotype of the Female Liar Resurfaces in Jones v. 
Clinton, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 123, 130 (1997) (“Because ‘sexual advances’ and ‘requests for sexual 
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  See, e.g., In re Tompkins, 290 B.R. 194, 201 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2003) (concluding that there was 
not a hostile work environment partly based on the fact that “although the [alleged harasser] may have 
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The issue of “me too” evidence presents a different, but related, evi-
dentiary dilemma.  In both “he said, she said” and “me too” cases, plaintiffs 
must rely mainly on circumstantial evidence.  However, whereas “he said, 
she said” plaintiffs are generally limited to just their own testimony, “me 
too” plaintiffs can point to the testimony of others claiming to have been 
similarly mistreated to buttress their claims.  This will likely improve a 
plaintiff’s chances of successfully alleging abuse, but admitting “me too” 
evidence will create a challenge for efficient judicial administration as well. 
Unlike the barren testimonial desert of “he said, she said” cases, the 
prospect of admitting “me too” evidence after Sprint potentially poses the 
problem of hearing an unmanageable number of witnesses.  Employment 
discrimination litigation may thus be transformed into something akin to the 
Jarndyce litigation of Dickens’s Bleak House—decades without end and an 
infinite procession of character witnesses, each raising the ante for the op-
position.12  Even the most reprehensible have friends willing to testify on 
their behalf.  After Sprint, each party will be clamoring to enhance their list 
of witnesses supporting their particular side of the debate. 
One suspects that the endless parade of witnesses to which Sprint has 
potentially opened the door will displease the courts, and the courts will 
therefore endeavor to pare this parade down to a manageable maximum 
number of “me too” witnesses (likely to be seen by the parties, of course, as 
the minimum).13  The lower courts will have to develop an efficient method 
for assessing the relevance of each potential “me too” witness’s prospective 
testimony in order to separate the prejudicial from the probative. 
This proliferation of case-by-case adjudication will further contribute 
to the dense underbrush of employment discrimination cases whose results 
                                                                                                                           
done or said some of the things that [the alleged victim] testified to, her testimony as to his words, con-
duct and actions appeared considerably exaggerated . . . .”); see also Kim Lane Scheppele, Just the Facts 
Ma’am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary Habits, and the Revision of Truth, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
123, 123 (1992) (discussing how testimony of cases of sexualized violence, including sexual harass-
ment, “evolve into a ‘he said, she said’ battle of competing narratives in which . . . the defendant . . . 
wins by default simply because the evidence is contested”). 
12
  See CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Oxford University Press 1989) (1853).  The Jarndyce 
litigation involved a dispute over a will and carried on for generations.  As decades passed, litigation 
costs drained the contested estate, virtually no one from the inception of the litigation remained alive, 
and virtually no one could remember what the original contested issues had been. 
Admitting “me too” witnesses in support of one side of a dispute will create incentives for the op-
posing side to produce similar testimony on its behalf, which will, in turn, create an incentive for the 
first side to produce additional “me too” witnesses in an effort to outdo the opposing side.  Unless trial 
judges strictly control the amount of “me too” testimony, the simplest employment discrimination litiga-
tion has the potential to, like the Jarndyce litigation, drag on endlessly at a substantial cost to everyone 
involved. 
13
  See, e.g., Wagoner v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 07-1229-JTM, 2008 WL 821952, at *5 (D. Kan. Mar. 26, 
2008) (recognizing that Sprint requires a fact-based analysis of whether evidence of discrimination by 
other supervisors is relevant, but finding that a discovery request by the plaintiffs intended to “bolster 
their claims . . .  by showing discriminatory treatment of other employees . . . [was] overly broad and not 
reasonably tailored to the claims in [the] case”). 
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depend on whether “me too” evidence will be admitted.  As the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia summarized in Elion v. 
Jackson,14 the most recent post-Sprint decision, “me too” “testimony is nei-
ther per se admissible nor per se inadmissible; the question whether such 
testimony is relevant and sufficiently more probative than unfairly prejudi-
cial in a particular case is ‘fact-based and depends on many factors, includ-
ing how closely related the evidence is to the plaintiff’s circumstances and 
theory of the case.’”15 
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF “ME TOO” EVIDENCE 
The potential admission of “me too” evidence has high stakes for both 
plaintiff-employees and defendant-employers.  Indeed, just as plaintiffs 
might cite such evidence to support claims of discrimination, “an em-
ployer’s favorable treatment of other members of a protected class can cre-
ate an inference that the employer lacks discriminatory intent.”16  “Me too” 
evidence of nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory behavior by an employer 
can be used to disprove claims of discrimination or retaliatory practices. 
Yet, though persuasive, it should be remembered that “me too” evi-
dence will not and should not itself be dispositive.  Production of, for ex-
ample, favorable overall statistics showing that the employer promotes 
more women and minorities than are proportionally represented in the 
population or in the work force at large, will not insulate an employer from 
liability for individual acts of deliberate unlawful discrimination.17 
CONCLUSION 
While Sprint does not establish a theoretical framework for lower 
courts to apply in deciding whether to admit “me too” evidence of employ-
ment discrimination, the Supreme Court’s refusal to categorically deny such 
evidence will have significant practical implications for both plaintiff-
employees and defendant-employers.  Namely, collecting “me too” wit-
nesses and statistics will become a regular part of trial preparation for both 
parties, and one can imagine a resulting situation in which parties to em-
ployment discrimination disputes try to outdo each other by presenting lar-
ger numbers of “me too” witnesses than their counterparts. 
As plaintiffs and defendants begin assembling armies of “me too” wit-
nesses, courts will have to establish some parameters for admitting such 
evidence.  In this way, Sprint’s legacy will likely be the increased prolifera-
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  Id. at *18 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2008) (quoting Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 128 S. Ct. 
1140, 1147 (2008)). 
16
  Id. at *19. 
17
  See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 442, 453–56 (1982) (recognizing that such statistics might 
be used to rebut the inference of an action’s discriminatory intent but do not give employers license to 
discriminate against individual employees). 
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tion of the underbrush composed of “me too” employment-discrimination 
cases.  At the end of the day, the practical solution will probably be left, as 
it usually is, to the pragmatic wisdom of trial court judges, who cannot 
permit either party to parade litanies of fungible witnesses through the 
courts.18  From the bench, the trial court judges will eventually have to find 
a more habitable jurisprudential territory, somewhere between the desert of 
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